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TOWARD

A

MORE

EFFICIENT BANKRUPTCY

LAW: MORTGAGE FINANCING UNDER THE 2005
BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENTS
Thomas E.Plank'

I. INTRODUCTION
2
Many commentators have criticized the consumer' and business
provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005 (the "2005 Amendments").' The 2005 Amendments, however, do
contain some good news for both consumers and entities in the business of
originating mortgage loans. The 2005 Amendments expanded certain
"protected transaction" provisions in the Bankruptcy Code that allow the
immediate acceleration and liquidation of certain "repurchase agreements" 4
and "securities contracts"5 and the liquidation of collateral pledged in

*

I.

2.
3.

4.
5.

Joel A. Katz, Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law; A.B. 1968,
Princeton University; J.D. 1974, University of Maryland; Of Counsel, McKee Nelson, LLP. I have
personally benefited from securitization, both intellectually and financially. I have been involved in
securitizations since 1987. 1served as issuer's counsel and bankruptcy counsel for securitizations,
as a partner with Kutak Rock, LLP until 1994, thereafter serving as a consultant on securitization
transactions. Since June 2001, 1have been Of Counsel to McKee Nelson, LLP, providing advice on
bankruptcy and security interest matters in securitizations, including the drafting oftrue sale opinions
and non-consolidation opinions and providing advice on structuring transactions to ensure true sales
and non-consolidation. Nevertheless, my belief in the value and soundness of securitization reflects
my convictions and not my economic interests. As will be apparent in this article, I believe that
society would be better off if the Bankruptcy Code were amended to obviate the need for the
structural limitations, including true sale opinions and non-consolidation opinions, required by
securitizations.
See Professor Robert Lawless, Small Business and the 2005 Bankruptcy Law: ShouldMom & Apple
Pie Be Worried? 31 S.ILL. U. L.J. 585 (2007); see also Peter C. Alexander, "Herstory" Repeals:
The Bankruptcy Code Harms Women and Children, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 571 (2005); Jean
Braucher, A Fresh Startfor Personal Bankruptcy Reform: The Needfor Simplification anda Single
Portal, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1295 (2006); John Rao, Testing the Limits of Statutory Construction
Doctrines: Deconstructing the 2005 Bankruptcy Act, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1427 (2006); Eugene R.
Wedoff, Major Consumer Bankruptcy Effects ofBapcpa, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 31.
Lawless, supra note 1; see also Ralph Brubaker, Taking Exception to the New Corporate Discharge
Exceptions, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 757 (2005).
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (enacted April 20, 2005, generally effective for cases
commenced on or after 180 days after its enactment). Congress enacted further clarifying
amendments on December 12, 2006. See Pub. L. No. 109-390, 120 Stat. 2692.
See II U.S.C.A. § 101(47)(West Supp. 2006) (quoted infra note68 anddiscussedinaccompanying
text.
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 741(7) (West Supp. 2006), quoted infra note 75 and discussed in accompanying
text.
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connection with those contracts to include transactions involving mortgage
loans. This extension of the protected transaction provisions to mortgage
loans will reduce both the costs of originating mortgage loans for the
originators and the costs to mortgagors.
The purpose of this article is to describe how these protected transactions
lower the costs of originating mortgage loans. This description, however, first
requires an understanding of the costs the Bankruptcy Code imposes on
secured creditors (described by David Carlson as a "bankruptcy tax" 6 ) and the
response to this tax: The development of securitization that significantly
lowers the costs to originators of mortgage loans and their borrowers by
avoiding most of this bankruptcy tax.7 The 2005 Amendments do not
eliminate the need for securitization, but for certain significant types of
financing they will avoid the bankruptcy tax without the costs of securitization
structures.
II. FINANCING MORTGAGE LOANS: AN OVERVIEW
A mortgage loan is a monetary obligation typically evidenced by a
promissory note secured by a "mortgage" or "deed of trust" or similar
instrument.' The most common use of a mortgage loan is to enable
individuals to acquire homes. The basic type of mortgage loan is a 30 year,
fixed rate, amortizing loan.9 For example, a $100,000 mortgage loan bearing
interest at the rate of 6% per annum repayable over 30 years requires 360
monthly payments of $599.55 each. The monthly payment consists of one
month's interest on the outstanding balance at the beginning of the month plus
a partial payment of principal, calculated to provide for the full payment of
principal over 30 years.'0 Hence, the first monthly payment consists of an

6.
7.

See David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundationsof Securitization,39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055,
1064 (1998).
See generally Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25
CARDozo L. REV. 1655 (2004) [hereinafter, Plank, Security of Securitization] (describing
securitization and its benefits and arguing that the legal and practical foundations of securitization
are secure); See also The Key to Securitization: Isolatingthe Assets to Be Securitizedfrom the Risk
ofAn Insolvency Proceeding(ch. 7, pages 1-1 through 1-128), in JOHN ARNHOLZ AND EDWARD E.
GAINOR, EDS., OFFERINGS OF ASSET BACKED SECURITIES (Aspen Pub. 2006) [hereinafter, Plank, The

Key to Securitization](describing in detail how securitizations are structured to reduce the risks of
insolvency of an originator).
8.

9.

10.

See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 1.1, at 1-4 (4th ed.

2001).
See, e.g., Multistate Fixed Rate Note-Single Family-Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Instrument
Form 3200 1/01, availableat http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/unifnotes.html (last visited Mar.
16, 2007).
Calculations on file with the author. These calculations can be done on a Microsoft Excel program.
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interest payment equal to 1/12th of 6% on $100,000, or $500, and a partial
principal payment of $99.55. The next monthly payment consists of interest
equal to 1/12th of 6% on $99,900.45, or $499.50, and a partial principal
payment of $100.05. Assuming no prepayment of the mortgage loan, the last
payment, the 3 6 0' payment due on the maturity date, would consist of $2.99
of interest and $596.56 of principal. A variation that would provide for faster
repayment but a larger monthly payment is a 15 year fixed rate loan. For
example, a $100,000 mortgage loan bearing interest at the rate of 6% per
annum repayable over 15 years requires a monthly payment of $843.86, which
is substantially higher than that for a 30 year mortgage loan.
There are other variations of a mortgage loan. A common variation is a
variable rate mortgage loan in which the interest rate varies according to a
variety of indices, such as Eleventh District Cost of Funds, six month LIBOR
(London Interbank Offering Rate), one year LIBOR, or one year Treasury
Index." After the interest rate changes, the monthly payment is adjusted to
provide for full amortization of the loan over the 30 year period. Another
variation is an interest only loan for a certain period of time. To the extent
that the monthly payment reflects only the payment of interest and not
principal, the monthly payment will be smaller. A smaller monthly payment
allows a mortgagor to qualify for a larger loan with less income.' 2 In
particular, commercial mortgage loans and home equity lines of credit often
require only the payment of interest and, in some cases, some payment of
principal but not enough to amortize the loan by its maturity date. Hence, at
the maturity date of this kind of mortgage loan, there will be a "balloon"
payment equal to the original balance of the loan less any partial principal
payments.
Mortgage loans, as a type ofreceivable, present unique challenges. First,
unlike government bonds and corporate bonds, which pay interest periodically
and then pay all of the principal on the maturity date, mortgage loans pay
portions of principal each month. Accordingly, any holder of a mortgage loan
must be equipped to handle these dribbles of principal.

11.

12.

See e.g., Multistate Fixed Rate Note-Single Family-Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Instrument
Form 3200 1/01, availableat http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/unifnotes.html (last visited Mar.
16, 2007).
The ratio of the monthly payments on the mortgage loan plus other required payments, such as
property insurance payments and real estate taxes, may not exceed specific percentages of the
mortgagor's stable monthly income. See, e.g., FREDDIE MAC SINGLE FAMILY SINGLE-FAMILY
SELLER/SERVICER GUIDE, volume I, Ch. 37, Underwriting the Borrower, 37.15: Monthly housing
expense-to-income ratio (5/21/04), availableat http://www.allregs.com/Thlmc (last visited Mar. 16,
2007).
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Second, most mortgage loans have a 30 year term. Most mortgage loans
are prepayable without penalty at any time, and most buyers of mortgage loans
assume that a certain percentage of mortgage loans prepay every month.
However, even if a pool of mortgage loans-say, a pool of$ 100,000,000-were
to prepay at a constant annual rate of 10%, the pool of mortgage loans would
not be prepaid for more than ten years. 3 Accordingly, a change in market
mortgage rates will have a dramatic effect on the value of the loan. For
example, for a pool of $100,000,000 of 30 year mortgage loans bearing an
annual fixed interest rate of 6%, if market mortgage rates were to rise to 8%,
the present value of the mortgage loans would decrease dramatically to less
than $82 million, assuming no prepayment, and to approximately $92.1
million assuming a constant annual prepayment rate of 10%. In addition,
when market mortgage interest rates increase, the rate of prepayment also
tends to decline. Hence, if a buyer had bought a pool of mortgage loans
assuming a 10% prepayment rate, and an increase in market rates by 2
percentage points caused the prepayment rate to fall to 5%, the present value
of the mortgage loans would decrease by $2.8 million to $89.3 million.
Accordingly, mortgage loans bear a significant risk of gain or loss
because of changes in market interest rates. This specific feature of mortgage
loans led to the entire insolvency of the savings and loan industry in the early
1980s, which held low rate long term mortgage loans whose value declined
when inflation and mortgage rates went up. 4 This particular aspect of
mortgage loans produced a significant change in the 1970s and the 1980s in
the way mortgage loan were financed. 5
As of the end of 2006, there were over $13.3 trillion of mortgage loans
outstanding, of which approximately $10.2 trillion were single family

13.
14.

15.

Calculations on file with the author. These calculations can be done on a Microsoft Excel program.
See Robert J. Laughlin, Note, Causesof the Savings andLoan Debacle,59 FORDHAM L. REv. s301,
S302-11 (1991); Kenneth E. Scott, Never Again: The S & L Bailout Bill, 45 BUS. LAW. 1883,
1885-93 (1990); Lawrence J. White, The S&L Debacle,59 FORDHAM L. REV. S57, S61-65 (1991);
See also Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm., 499 U.S. 554,556-58 (1991). In this case, Cottage Savings
Association had exchanged approximately $6.5 million of single family mortgage participation
interests, which had a market value of $4.5 million, for similar mortgage participation interests held
by four other savings associations. A regulatory directive of the former Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, which was later succeeded by the Office of Thrift Supervision, allowed such an exchange
without recording a loss for regulatory accounting purposes. The exchange did, however, generate
for Cottage Savings a $2.4 million loss for income tax purposes. The Court upheld the deductibility
of the loss.
See generally Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current
Issues andNew Frontiers,69 TEX. L. REv. 1369, 1380-97 (1991).
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mortgage loans. 6 Over $9.7 trillion of these mortgage loans represented
obligations of households, and of this amount, approximately $9 trillion were
first lien single family mortgage loans, and approximately $1 trillion were
home equity line of credit or second lien single family mortgage loans.' 7 That
is a lot of money. Indeed, the outstanding balance of mortgage loans exceeded
the outstanding obligations of the federal government ($4.9 trillion) 8 and the
non-mortgage credit market debt of non-financial businesses ($5.8 trillion),
the bulk of which consisted of corporate bonds ($3.2 trillion).' 9
The money used to finance the origination of mortgage loans come from
a variety of sources. Table 1 shows the primary sources as of the end of 2006,
as well as the end of each of 1996 and 2001.

16.

17.
18.
19.

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE
UNITED STATES, ACCOUNT FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS 1995-2006, tbl L. 217, Total Mortgages,
lines 1, 2 (Mar. 8, 2007) [hereinafter, "FRB FLOW OF FUNDS"] available at http://www.federal
reserve. gov/releases/zl (last visited May 31, 2007).
See FRB FLOW OF FUNDS, supra note 16, tbl L. 218, Home Mortgages, lines 2, 22.
See FRB FLOW OF FUNDS, supra note 16, tbl L. 2, Credit Market Debt Owed by Nonfinancial
Sectors, line 23.
See FRB FLOW OF FUNDS, supra note 16, tbl L. 101, Nonfinancial Sectors, lines 18, 21, 24 ($8.992
trillion less $3.220 mortgage debt).
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Table 1: Home Mortgages Held by Sectors 1996-20062o
Amounts in Billions
Holder

1996

%

2001

%

2006

Household

86.8

2.4%

94.9

1.7%

67.6

0.7%

677.6

18.4%

1,023.9

18.2%

2,053.0

20.1%

513.7

14.0%

620.4

11.0%

869.6

8.5%

7.0

0.2%

4.9

0.1%

4.9

0.0%

198.5

5.4%

225.6

4.0%

342.6

3.4%

1,678.8

45.7%

2,748.5

48.7%

3,822.2

37.5%

215.4

5.9%

434.1

7.7%

1,834.5

18.0%

87.0

2.4%

209.7

3.7%

539.2

5.3%

209.9

5.7%

277.5

4.9%

656.6

6.4%

3,674.7

100%

5,639.5

100%

10,190.2

100%

Commercial

%

banking
Savings
institutions
Life insurance
companies
Governmentsponsored
enterprises
Agency- and GSEbacked mortgage
pools
ABS issuers
Finance
companies
Other2
Total
Total in December

4,675.6

6,440.6

10,190.2

2006 Dollars

As a comparison, Table 2 shows the primary sources as of the end of
each of the years 1946, 1956, 1966, 1876, and 1986.

20.
21.

See FRB FLOW OF FUNDS, supra note 16, tbl L. 217, Total Mortgages, lines 15-31.
"Other" consists of nonfinancial business; state, local, and federal governments; credit unions;
private pension funds; state and local government retirement funds; and REITS.
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Table 2: Home Mortgages Held by Sectors 1946-198622
Amounts in Billions

Holder

1946

%

1956

%

1966

%

1976

%

1986

Household

6.2

27%

8.9

9%

18.1

8%

21.3

4%

91.9

5%

Commercial

4.6

20%

16.2

16%

32.8

14%

86.2

16%

232.0

13%

8.8

38%

47.1

48%

131.8

57%

307.0

57%

568.3

33%

2.5

11%

20.1

20%

30.2

13%

16.1

3%

12.8

1%

0.0

0%

0.6

1%

4.4

2%

31.4

6%

101.4

6%

0.0

0%

0.0

0%

0.3

0%

37.3

7%

519.5

30%

ABS issuers

0.0

0%

0.0

0%

0.0

0%

0.0

0%

16.6

1%

Finance

0.1

0%

1.1

1%

3.3

1%

9.1

2%

52.4

3%

Other

0.8

3%

4.7

5%

11.8

5%

26.6

5%

127.1

7%

Total

23.0

100%

98.7

100%

232.7

100%

535.0

100%

1,722.0

100%

%

banking
Savings
institutions
Life insurance
companies
Governmentsponsored
enterprises
Agency- and
GSE-backed
mtg pools

companies

Total In

215.9

721.7

1,427.3

1,855.0

3,144.8

December
2006 Dollars

Table 1 shows that as of the end of 2006, the largest holder of single
family mortgage loans were pools formed by two federal agencies, the
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) and the successor
agency to the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), and two GSEs or

22.

See FRB FLOW OF FUNDS, supra note 16, tbl L. 217, Total Mortgages, lines 15-31.
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governmentally sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, interests
in which have been sold to investors. The next largest group of holders were
commercial banks, with the issuers of asset backed securities a close third.
Table 1 shows the dramatic growth of the amount of mortgage loans held by
issuers of asset backed securities, from only 5.9% of the total in 1996 to 18%
ten years later. Table 2 also shows that issuers of asset backed securities
began holding mortgage loans in 1986.
In addition, Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate the decline in holdings by
savings associations, from close to or above 50% from 1946 though 1976, to
less than 8.5% in 2006. In addition, from 1946 through 1976, life insurance
companies and individuals held substantial portions of outstanding mortgage
loans, but those percentages declined to almost nothing by 2006.
III. THE BANKRUPTCY TAX ON SECURED CREDIT
Outside ofbankruptcy, unsecured creditors could obtain payment of their
debts from defaulting borrowers by obtaining a judgment and attaching or
garnishing the borrower's property.2 3 Secured creditors, however, can obtain
payment by obtaining possession of their collateral and selling it at a
foreclosure sale and, in the case of collateral that consists of mortgage loans
and other receivables, such as automobile loans, equipment loans and leases,
credit card receivables, trade receivables, student loans, and other payment
obligations, by collecting those receivables from the persons obligated on the
receivables.24
Historically, bankruptcy law replaced the single creditor collection
remedies with a collective proceeding that adjusted the relationship between
an insolvent debtor and his, her, or its unsecured creditors." As I have

23.

24.

25.

See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.R.L. § 5201 (McKinney 2006) (specifying the property against which a money
judgment may be enforced); § 5230 (providing for the issuance of a property execution); § 5231
(specifying the issuance of an income execution); § 5232 (providing for levy on personal property);
§ 5236 (providing for sale of personal property levied upon); § 5235 (providing for levy on real
property); § 5236 (providing for sale of real property levied upon).
See, e.g. U.C.C. § 9-609 (2006) (permitting a secured creditor to take possession of collateral);
§ 9-610(a) (permitting disposition of collateral); § 9-615(a) (providing for distribution of proceeds
to secured creditor and other persons, including the debtor); § 9-607(a) (permitting a secured party
to collect from and enforce collateral).
Thomas E. Plank, The ConstitutionalLimits ofBankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REv. 487 (1996) (describing
the different types of bankruptcy laws in effect in England and America before the adoption the U.S.
Constitution and the federal bankruptcy laws enacted in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries);
Thomas E. Plank, Why Bankruptcy Judges Need Not and Should Not be Article IIIJudges, 72 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 567 (1998) (describing the adjudication of bankruptcy cases under eighteenth-century
English and American bankruptcy laws); Charles J. Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in
the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1995); Charles J. Tabb, The HistoricalEvolution
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described elsewhere, however, before 1933 a bankruptcy liquidation case had
little effect on secured creditors that had possession or control of their
collateral, and a secured creditor in possession or control could generally
liquidate its collateral notwithstanding a borrower's bankruptcy.2 6' This happy
state for secured creditors ended with several amendments to the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, beginning in 1933 and culminating in the Chandler Act of 1938.
These Depression era amendments, which extended the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court in reorganizations to all of the debtor's property wherever
located, empowered a debtor in possession to prevent a secured creditor's
liquidation of its collateral.2 7 The Bankruptcy Code of 1978 further limited
secured creditors' rights in bankruptcy.
Currently, under Section 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, the
commencement of a bankruptcy case by the filing of a voluntary 28 or
involuntary29 petition creates an estate that consists primarily of "all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the

case." 30 In addition, a trustee is appointed that takes control of the property
of the estate. In a chapter 7 liquidation, the trustee is an independent third
person.3' In a chapter 11 reorganization, the debtor in possession is normally
the bankruptcy trustee.32 In a chapter 12 or 13, a separate trustee is appointed

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

31.

32.

of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 329-31 (1991).
Thomas E. Plank, The Creditor in Possession Under the Bankruptcy Code: History, Text, and
Policy, 59 MD. L. REv. 253, 264-68 (2000) [hereinafter "Plank, Creditor in Possession"].
See id.
at 268-81.
See II U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
See II U.S.C. § 303(a), (b), (h) (2000).
See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000):
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates
an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located
and by whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.
The other enumerated items refer to community property § 541(a)(2), and to property added to the
estate after the commencement of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3)-(7) (West Supp. 2006).
See II U.S.C. § 701(a) (2000) (appointment of interim trustee by United States trustee); II U.S.C.
§ 702(b),(d) (2000) (election of permanent trustee by creditors or, if no election, continuation of the
interim trustee); II U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) (2000) (duty of trustee to "collect and reduce to money the
property of the estate for which such trustee serves").
See II U.S.C. § 1101(1) (2000) (defining the "debtor in possession" as the debtor unless an
independent person is appointed as trustee); II U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2000) (providing that the debtor
in possession has most of the rights, powers, and duties of a trustee); II U.S.C. § 1108 (2000)
(providing that the trustee may operate the debtor's business).
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but the debtor retains control over the property of the estate and has some of
the duties of the bankruptcy trustee.33
A bankruptcy case affects secured creditors in several ways. First, all of
the debtor's claims, including the claims of secured creditors, are
accelerated.3 4 Although unsecured creditors are not entitled to interest that
accrues on their claims after the commencement of the case,35 a secured
creditor continues to accrue interest on its claim so long as the value of its
collateral exceeds the amount of its claim.36 Undersecured creditors do not
accrue interest because there is no excess value. For example, a creditor with
an $80 claim secured by a property item worth only $60 has a secured claim
for $60 and an unsecured claim for $20.
Second, although the debts of secured creditors are immediately
accelerated, they are not paid immediately. Under Section 362, the
commencement of a case imposes an automatic stay of any creditor collection
action against the debtor or property owned by the debtor.37 In particular, the
commencement of a case stays any act to obtain possession or control of

33.

34.
35.

36.

37.

See II U.S.C. § 1202(a) (2000) (providing, in chapter 12, for appointment of a trustee to perform
certain duties); 11 U.S.C. § 1203 (2000) (providing, in chapter 12, that the debtor, which is
implicitly treated as a debtor in possession, has most of the rights, powers, and duties of a trustee and
may operate the debtor's farm or commercial fishing business); 11 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2000)
(providing, in chapter 13, for appointment of a trustee to perform certain duties); 11 U.S.C. § 1303
(2000) (providing, in chapter 13, that the debtor has certain fights and powers of a trustee, including
the power to use, sell, or lease property of the estate); II U.S.C. § 1304 (2000) (providing, in chapter
13, that a debtor engage in business may continue to operate the business).
See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2000) (providing that the bankruptcy court, after notice and a hearing, shall
determine the amount of the claim of a creditor as of the date of the filing of the petition).
See § 502(b)(2) (providing that after determining the amount of a creditors claim, the bankruptcy
court "shall allow such claim in such amount, except to the extent that ... such claim is for
unmatured interest").
See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2000) (providing that "an allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien
on property in which the estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoffunder section 553 of this
title, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest [sic]
in such property, or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an
unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest [sic] or the amount so subject
to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim"). This section is incorrectly worded. If a
debtor owns a property item worth $100 in which a creditor has a security interest to secure an $80
debt, the estate's interest in the property item-its equity-is $20 and the creditor's interest is $80. The
creditor has no interest in the estate's interest. Instead of referring to the "creditor's interest in the
estate's interest [sic] in such property" the section should have referred to the "creditor's interest in
such property." See generallySee Thomas E. Plank, The OuterBoundariesofthe Bankruptcy Estate,
47 EMORY L. J. 1193, 1230 (1998) [hereinafter Plank, Bankruptcy Estate]. It may be that the
property owned by the estate is less than the entire property item, such as a leasehold or a co-tenant's
interest, but the creditor's interest can never exceed the property interest owned by the debtor and
now by the estate. To obviate any concern on that point, however, the provision could refer to the
"creditor's interest in the property interest owned by the estate."
See 1I U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2000).
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property of the estate' s or to collect a claim against the debtor.39 Therefore,
a secured creditor may not obtain payment of its debt through a foreclosure
sale of its collateral, even if it has possession of the collateral. This
prohibition arises not because-as commonly but mistakenly thought-a
foreclosure sale is an act to obtain possession or control of property of the
estate, but because it is an act to collect a claim.40 A secured creditor can only
be paid at the conclusion of the bankruptcy case-liquidation and distribution4"
in a chapter 7 or payment under a confirmed plan 2-or upon obtaining relief
from the automatic stay, the success and timing of which are uncertain.43
Third, the bankruptcy trustee may use property of the estate, either with
or without court approval, including the estate's interest in property items
subject to a security interest.4 4 Fourth, the trustee may grant a lender to the
debtor-in-possession a security interest in collateral pledged to a secured
creditor, including a security interest that has priority over the pre-petition
secured creditor.45

38.
39.
40.

41.
42.

43.

44.

45.

See § 362(a)(3) (stay of "any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from
the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate").
See § 362(a)(6) (stay of "any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case").
As I have explained elsewhere, the exercise by a secured creditor of its rights against collateral
pledged by a debtor is not exercising control over property of the estate, which consists only of the
debtor's rights in the collateral, or violating § 362(a)(4) or (5), which stays acts to create or enforce
a "lien.". See Plank, Bankruptcy Estate, supra note 36, 1259-62, 1264-67; Plank, Creditor in
Possession,supra note 26, at 312-15.
See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2000) (requiring the trustee to distribute property of the estate).
See II U.S.C. §§ 129(a)(7)-(9), 1129(b), 1225(a)(5), 1125 (b)(1), 1325(a)(5), 1325(b)(1) (2000)
(specifying minimum treatment of creditors for confirmation of plan); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1141(a),
1227(a), 1327(a) (2000) (providing that a confirmed plan binds all creditors).
See § 362(c) (providing that, with certain exceptions, the automatic stay continues until the earliest
of the time the case is closed, the case is dismissed, or if the case is a case under chapter 7
concerning an individual or a case under chapters 9, 11, 12, or 13, a discharge is granted or denied);
§ 362(d) (providing for relief from the automatic stay).
See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2000) (use of property of the estate not in the ordinary course of
business); § 363(c)(1) (use of property of the estate other than cash collateral in the ordinary course
of business without court approval); § 363(c)(2) (use of cash collateral in the ordinary course of
business with consent of the secured creditor or court approval); § 363(a) (defining cash collateral
as "cash, negotiable instruments, documents of title, securities, deposit accounts, or other cash
equivalents whenever acquired in which the estate and an entity other than the estate have an
interest").
See 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(3) (2000) (providing that the court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize
the obtaining of credit or the incurring of debt "secured by a junior lien on property of the estate that
is subject to a lien"); § 364(d)(1) (providing that, the "court, after notice and a hearing, may
authorize the obtaining of credit or the incurring of debt secured by a senior or equal lien on property
of the estate that is subject to a lien only if(A) the trustee is unable to obtain such credit otherwise;
and (B) there is adequate protection of the interest of the holder of the lien on the property of the
estate on which such senior or equal lien is proposed to be granted"). These subsections also
incorrectly refer to "property of the estate subject to a lien." The only time that property of the estate
can be subject to a lien is when a property of the estate is pledged to secure a post-petition debt. If
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Fifth, under the poorly reasoned and erroneously decided Supreme Court
case of United States v. Whiting Pools, 46 a debtor that files for bankruptcy
after a secured creditor has repossessed the debtor's tangible property items
may require the secured creditor to return the property items to the
debtor-now the debtor in possession. This case, however, does not apply to
payment obligations due to the debtor. In Citizens Bank of Maryland v.
Strumpf,47 the Court held that an administrative hold on a bank account did not
violate the automatic stay. In this case, a bank at which the debtor had a
checking account-which consists of an obligation of the bank to pay money
to the order of the debtor-was also a creditor of a debtor. Under nonbankruptcy law, the bank had a right to set off the debt owed by the debtor to
the bank against the amounts the bank was obligated to pay to the order of the
debtor. The Court correctly noted:
Respondent's reliance on [the automatic stay] provisions rests on the false
premise that petitioner's administrative hold took something from respondent,
or exercised dominion over property that belonged to respondent. That view
of things might be arguable if a bank account consisted of money belonging
to the depositor and held by the bank. In fact, however, it consists of nothing
more or less than a promise to pay, from the bank to the depositor,. . . and
petitioner's temporary refusal to pay was neither a taking of possession of
respondent's property nor an exercising of control over it, but merely a
refusal to perform its promise.48

Nevertheless, although any creditor that owes money to the debtor and
therefore to the bankruptcy estate need not pay that debt to the extent of its
49
right of set off, that creditor may not actually exercise its right of set off.
The creditor must continue to account for, and reserve capital against, a nonperforming asset (the debt owed by the debtor to the creditor) and also
continue to carry on its books as a liability its debt owed to the debtor.
The limitations on the non-bankruptcy entitlements of secured creditors
impose a cost on them. The most significant costs arise from the immediate

a person owned a property interest-say, worth $ I00-subject to a lien-say for a debt equal to $80-and
becomes a debtor in bankruptcy, the property of the estate is only the debtor's interest-the equity
interest consisting of legal title and its rights under non-bankruptcy law, such as the right to
redemption. The debtor's equity and therefore the estate's interest-the property of the estate-is not
subject to a lien. See Plank, Bankruptcy Estate, supra note 36, 1230-31 & n. 160.
46.
47.

462 U.S. 198 (1983).
516 U.S. 16 (1995).

48.
49.

Strumpf 516 U.S. at 21.
See II U.S.C. § 362(a)(7) (2000) (staying "the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor"). This
subsection is not really necessary. The automatic stay of an act to collect a claim, discussedsupra
note 39 and accompanying text, would also prevent such a set off.
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acceleration of secured claims, and the inability to obtain immediate or quick
payment of those claims. These costs are equivalent to a tax levied on secured
creditors, the benefits of which go to the administrative expenses of the
bankruptcy case and the unsecured creditors. To recoup these costs, secured
lenders must charge a higher interest rate or other fees, a bankruptcy premium,
to all of their borrowers.
For many types of property items in the possession of the debtor, such as
goods being used in the debtor's business or personal life, these limitations on
secured creditors may make some sense. If a trucking company becomes a
debtor in bankruptcy and seeks to reorganize, it will not be able to do so if a
creditor with a security interest in the fleet of trucks can foreclose its security
interest against the fleet. If a steel producer becomes a debtor in bankruptcy
and seeks to reorganize, it will not be able to do so if a creditor with a security
interest in the raw material necessary for such processing can foreclose its
security interest. In my view, however, these considerations do not apply to
mortgage loans and other receivables.
The essential nature of receivables-which are characterized under the
Uniform Commercial Code as accounts, chattel paper, promissory notes, or
payment intangibles-is a monetary obligation of an obligor to pay money.50
The essential "use" of a receivable is the receipt of money in the future-the
return of the principal amount of the monetary obligation and any interest that
is payable on the principal amount.
To be sure, as Professor Robert Lawless has pointed out, the owners of all
business assets expect to earn a return, or yield, and such owners must take
action to realize this yield. Hence, the owner of a trucking company must
operate its equipment, the producer of steel must process its raw material
inventory into finished products, and the owners of mortgage loans and other
receivables must collect the payments, enforce the obligations against

50.

See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (defining an "account" to mean "a right to payment of a monetary
obligation, whether or not earned by performance, (i) for property that has been or is to be sold,
leased, licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed of, (ii) for services rendered or to be rendered," and
for a variety of other enumerated purposes, such as insurance, a secondary obligation, energy, hire
of a vessel, credit card charges, and lottery winnings, but excluding chattel paper or an instruments
and other specialized types of payment obligations, including commercial tort claims, deposit
accounts, investment property, and rights to payment for money or funds advanced other than credit
card receivables); § 9-102(a)( 11)
(providing that "chattel paper" is primarily "a record or records
that evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in .. .[or] a lease of specific
goods"); § 9-102(a)(65) (defining "promissory note" to mean "an instrument that evidences a
promise to pay a monetary obligation, does not evidence an order to pay, and does not contain an
acknowledgment by a bank that the bank has received for deposit a sum of money or funds");
§ 9-102(a)(61) (defining "payment intangible" to mean "a general intangible under which the
account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation"). A "general intangible" is any
personal property that is not included in another Article 9 type of collateral. See § 9-102(a)(42).

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 31

defaulting obligors, and otherwise service the mortgage loans or receivables.
In this sense, mortgage loans and other receivables are similar in kind to other
assets, such as equipment or goods.
On other hand, equipment and inventory do not by themselves turn into
cash, but the essential nature of a mortgage loan or other receivable is to turn
itself into cash. Indeed, the amount of effort to turn a mortgage loan or other
receivable into cash is minuscule in comparison to the amount of effort
necessary to earn a return from equipment or inventory. The effort is
measured by the amount of servicing fees that a servicer charges for servicing
mortgage loans and other receivables, an amount that varies-depending on the
type of receivables-from less than 0.25% per annum in the case of mortgage
loans to about 2% for credit card receivables. 5
Except in the case of the prohibition of the use of cash collateral without
court approval, even in the ordinary course of business, and Strumpf s
recognition that a failure of an obligor to pay money owed to a debtor is not
exercising control of property of the estate, the Bankruptcy Code does not
generally recognize the difference between receivables and other kinds of
property, such as goods. Nevertheless, the market place does recognize the
difference between mortgage loans and other receivables, on the one hand, and
other types of property such as goods.5 2 This difference is the foundation of
the several trillion dollar securitization industry. As I have described
elsewhere in greater detail,53 securitization reduces the bankruptcy tax on
secured lenders to originators and owners of mortgage loans and other
receivables, and therefore has reduced the bankruptcy premiums charged to
the obligors of mortgage loans and other receivables.

51.

52.

53.

See Standard and Poor's Rating Services, Structured Finance Credit Card Criteria 44 (1999)
(stating that the standard credit card servicing fee is 2%), (available at http://www
2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/creditcardcriteria_092004R.pdf) (last visited Apr. 3,
2007).
The LTV Steel case provides a good illustration. In re LTVSteel Co., 274 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 2001), then a BB rated steel producer, structured a trade receivables securitization in 1994 that
achieved a AAA rating, the highest possible, for the notes secured by the trade receivables. In 1998,
it also structured an inventory "securitization" that enabled the issuance of notes secured by
inventory owned by an SPE. Because the credit quality for the these notes depended so much on the
ability of LTV Steel to process the inventory, however, the notes achieved only a BBB rating, one
rating category higher than LTV Steel's rating. See Plank, Security of Securitization,supra note 7
at 1687-88. I served as an expert witness for Abbey National Treasury Services PLC, on the true sale
of the trade receivables and the proper structuring of the LTV trade receivables securitization in the
In re LTV Steel Co.
See generallyPlank, Securityof Securitization,supranote 7; Plank, The Key to Securitizationsupra
note 7.
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IV. RESPONSE TO THE BANKRUPTCY TAX: SECURITIZATION
The raw material for an originator of mortgage loans and most other
receivables is the cash to be lent to the mortgagors and other obligors.54
Originators of mortgage loans and other receivables raise this cash in several
ways. Originators must start with an equity investment, but such equity is
usually not sufficient. One way of raising cash is to sell the mortgage loans
and other receivables. Until an originator has a sufficiently large pool of
receivables to make such sales economical, the originator must borrow on a
short term basis pursuant to a "warehouse" line of credit. Further, the buyer
of the mortgage loans or other receivables must also finance the cost of
acquisition. In essence, whether as an originator or a buyer, owners of
mortgage loans or other receivables must eventually rely on long term credit.
Any owner of a pool of receivables faces two distinct risks: those
associated with the pool itself, and those not associated with the pool but
associated with its operations. In the case of the pool itself, the risks include:
(a) the credit quality of the particular obligors and the risk of default; (b) the
possibility that the market value of the receivable will change because of
changes in market interest rates after the interest rate on the receivable has
been fixed at the origination of the receivable; and (c) the risk that the
receivable will prepay slower or faster than expected at origination, which
may also affect the yield on the receivable." The risks not associated with the
pool itself include risks associated with other pools originated by the
originator and all of the other risks associated with an operating company,
such as the risk of generating insufficient revenue to pay overhead and profit
and the risks of tort and contract claims arising out of the business.
Lenders to originators also face these risks. In particular, a lender that
takes a security interest in a particular pool of receivables takes the risk that
the pool will not generate sufficient cash flow to repay the secured loan. In
addition, however, regardless of how well the pool performs, the lender also
takes all of the other risks associated with the operating company. The
originator may get into financial difficulty for reasons not associated with the

54.

55.

In the case of trade receivables, sellers of property or services that sell to their buyers on credit create
the trade receivables. In the case of many automobile loans and similar loans, automobile dealers
sell vehicles in exchange for chattel paper. In both cases, the owners of these receivables sell or
pledge them to obtain financing to acquire new property or to pay the cost of providing services or
to repay lenders that had financed the sellers' activities.
See generally Thomas E. Plank, The True Sale ofLoans and the Role of Recourse, 14 GEO. MASON
U. L. REV. 287,293-302 (1991) [hereinafter, Plank, True Sale] (describing the benefits and burdens
of owning receivables).
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pool and become a debtor in bankruptcy. Even if the particular pool of
receivables is performing well, the secured lender would then become subject
to the automatic stay, would not be able to foreclose on its collateral, and
would be required to participate in the bankruptcy case to ensure repayment
of all or most of its claim. Securitization reduces the bankruptcy premium
on receivables because it separates the risks associated with the pool from the
risks of an operating company. It does so through two well recognized legal
principles: the sale of assets to a separate legal entity. In the case of mortgage
loans, the most common form of securitization is the sale of the mortgage
loans to a trustee that issues pass-through certificates to investors. The trustee
is the legal owner of the mortgage loans, but the investors-the certificate
holders-are the beneficial owners of the mortgage loans.
In the case of some mortgage loans, such as home equity lines of credit,
and most kinds of other receivables, securitization takes the form of a sale of
these receivables to a special purpose, bankruptcy remote legal entity, such as
a corporation, limited liability company, Delaware statutory trust, or limited
partnership. This special purpose entity, or SPE, has a limited purpose: to
hold the receivables, to issue debt securities or obligations secured by the
receivables, and to enter into transactions related only to those activities, such
as servicing agreements, guarantees, and other related documents. Neither the
certificate trustee nor the SPE is empowered to be an operating company, and
in fact both are prohibited from engaging in any operations other than owning
the loans and, in the case of an SPE, issuing debt securities or obligations.56
The sale of the receivables by the originator to a certificate trustee or an
SPE separates the risks associated with the assets from the risks associated
with an operating company. Investors can more easily assess the risks
associated with the pool of receivables than they can the risks of an operating
company. Accordingly, a rating agency can issue a rating for securities
backed by a pool of receivables that is higher than the credit rating of an
originator, and indeed many securitizations involve receivables originated by
originators that do not have investment grade ratings.57

56.
57.

See Plank, Security of Securitization,supra note 7, at 1662-66.
There are four nationally recognized rating agencies in the United States: Standard & Poor's Ratings
Services, a division of McGraw Hill ("Standard and Poor's" or "S&P"); Moody's Investors Service,
Inc.; Fitch, Inc.; and Dominion Bond Rating Service Limited. See Securities and Exchange
Commission, Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit Ratings Under the Federal Securities Laws, 68
Fed. Reg. 35,258 (June 12, 2003) (concept release and request for comments). These rating agencies
assign ratings to debt securities. The four highest rating categories (AAA, AA, A, and BBB for
Standard & Poor's and Fitch, and Aaa, Aa,A, and Baa for Moody's, for example) are generally
considered "investment grade" securities. See, e.g., The Role and Function of Credit Rating
Agencies in the Operation of the Securities Markets, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport01 03.pdf (last visited Apr. 3,2007); Plank, Security
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Securitization saves originators and borrowers money. One study
estimated that in 1993 securitization of mortgage loans saved mortgagors
about $2 billion in origination fees on $1 trillion of mortgage loans
originated.58 Another study of a $4 billion securitization by General Motors
Acceptance Corporation ("GMAC") of automobile loans estimated that
GMAC saved 1.3% annually on the declining balance the $4 billion pool. 9
There are several causes for these savings. First, securitization transforms
fairly liquid assets into highly liquid securities. Although mortgage loans and
other receivables are reasonably easy to transfer, buyers of mortgage loans and
other receivables must do substantial due diligence to ensure the quality of the
underlying receivables. In a securitization, however, all of the legal
requirements for transfer of the receivables have been satisfied, the issuance
of the securities is accompanied by legal agreements and disclosure
documents designed to ensure and describe the quality of the underlying
receivables, and securities backed by receivables are extremely easy to
transfer.
Second, the conversion of receivables into securities expands the universe
of investors in receivables. A higher demand for receivables raises the price
of the receivables, and in the world of debt instruments, a higher price
translates into lower interest or yield on the debt instrument.6 ° Securitization
also allows for the carving up of cash flows into several tranches of different
maturities. For example, by creating separate classes of securities and
directing all of the payment of principal on 30 year mortgage loans first to one
class until that class is paid in full, and then to another class, securitization
takes advantage of the yield curve-the phenomena that, at most times, interest
rates for shorter term debt obligations will be lower than the interest rate on
longer term debt securities. This carving up of cash flows also permits an
easier matching of assets and liabilities for investors.
Finally, the avoidance of the bankruptcy tax on secured credit is a
substantial source of the savings. In this regard, the GMAC study is
instructive. This study compared GMAC's costs of raising capital through the

58.

59.

of Securitization,supra note 7, at 1661 n. 16.
See Steven K. Todd, The Effects ofSecuritization on Consumer Mortgage Costs, 29 REAL ESTATE
ECONOMICS 50 (Jan 2001) (finding that in 1993 securitization of mortgage loans saved consumers
more than $2 billion in mortgage origination fees, but criticizing the methodology of other studies
all finding a lowering of interest rates).
See James A. Rosenthal & Juan M. Ocampo, Analyzing the Economic Benefits ofSecuritizedCredit,
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 32, 36-40 (Fall 1988).

60.

For example, assume that you own a receivable with a principal of$ 1,000 that pays 6% in one year.
If someone were to offer to buy that receivable for $1010, the buyer is implicitly willing to accept
a yield not of 6% but 4.95%, which is (1.06* 1,000/ 1010)- 1. See Plank, Security of Securitization,
supra note 7, at 1693 on.158-60.
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issuance of$18 billion of its own AA rated corporate debt securities with the
costs of its $4 billion AAA rated asset backed securities backed by automobile
loans. This comparison eliminated the costs savings attributable to issuance
of securities and highlighted the savings from avoidance of the bankruptcy
tax. The following table comparing the cost components for each set of
securities illustrates this source of the saving. First, the actual interest rate
savings between GMAC's AA debt and the AAA asset backed securities was
only 10 basis points, that is, 0.10 percentage points. Second, the greater costs
of structuring the AAA asset backed securities-fees and credit enhancement
costs of 8 basis points-ate up most of those interest rate savings.
Significantly, however, the cost of the large amount of equity capital
necessary for GMAC to maintain a AA rating on its debt securities was 128
basis points. This equity capital was necessary to assure investors that
GMAC's likelihood of becoming a debtor in bankruptcy was remote.
Table 3: GMAC Debt and Securitization Cost Comparison
GMAC transaction and rating
principal amount
interest rate*
fees*
loss reserve/credit enhancement*
net cost of capital*
total*
net difference*
* Interest rates and costs per annum

Corp debt AA+
$18 billion
7.01%
0.20%
0.50%
1.28%
8.99%
1.30%

ABS AAA
$4 billion
6.91%
0.26%
0.52%
0.00%
7.69%

Although securitizations save originators money, the costs of structuring
a securitization can be higher than traditional financing, as the GMAC study
shows. To ensure the benefits of securitization, the receivables must be
isolated in a separate legal entity. Investors must look to the receivables
themselves and not to the originators. Hence, even if it would further lower
costs, originators may not incur any substantial liability for or retain any
substantial benefits from the future performance of the asset backed
securities.6 1 In the case of asset backed securities issued by an SPE, there are
the costs of creating and maintaining a separate legal entity with separate
accounts, books, records, and assets, and a separate board of directors or
managers with an independent director or manager or, in the case of a

61.

See Plank, Security of Securitization, supra note 7, at 1674-77.
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Delaware statutory trust, a separate trustee. Law firms must issue an opinion
to the effect that the receivables would not be included in the bankruptcy
estate of the seller (a "true sale opinion"), and, in the case of SPEs, an opinion
that the assets and liabilities of the SPE would not be substantively
consolidate with those of the SPE parent issuing debt securities (a "nonconsolidation opinion"). The 2005 Amendments, however, enable mortgage
originators in some transactions to achieve the benefits of securitization
without the costs of securitizations.
V. EXTENDING PROTECTED TRANSACTIONS TO MORTGAGE
LOANS
Before the enactment of the 2005 Amendments, the Bankruptcy Code
exempted certain transactions from the automatic stay,62 from those provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code that prevented a party to a contract from terminating
the contract because the other party became a debtor in bankruptcy, 63 and from
those provisions ofthe Bankruptcy Code that permitted the bankruptcy trustee
to avoid unperfected transfers,' 4 preferential transfers, 65 and constructively
fraudulent transfers.66 These protected transactions included "repurchase
agreements" and "securities contracts." These provisions have long been

62.
63.

64.

65.

66.

11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000), discussedsupra note 37 and accompanying text.
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2000) (permitting a bankruptcy trustee to assume or reject executory
contracts); § 365(e)(1):
Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease, or in
applicable law, an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor may not be
terminated or modified, and any right or obligation under such contract or lease may
not be terminated or modified, at any time after the commencement of the case
solely because of a provision in such contract or lease that is conditioned on-(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time before the closing
of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this title or
a custodian before such commencement.
See II U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (2000) (providing that the bankruptcy trustee has the rights and powers
of, or may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor that
is voidable by a hypothetical lien creditor).
See II U.S.C. § 547(b) (2000) (permitting a bankruptcy trustee to avoid certain prepetition transfers
of an interest of the debtor in property to or for the benefit of credits on account of antecedents if
such transfers enabled the creditors to obtain more than they would obtain had they received a
distribution in a chapter 7 liquidation).
See II U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2000) (providing that the trustee may avoid certain pre-petition
transfers or obligations ifthe debtor received less than a reasonably equivalent value for such transfer
or obligation; and either (i) was insolvent or became insolvent as a result of such transfer obligation
or (ii) was left with unreasonably small capital or (iii) intended to incur debts beyond its ability to
pay).
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important in the securities and financial industry,
and the 2005 Amendments
67
effectiveness.
their
increase
to
were designed
Significantly for mortgage loan originators, the 2005 Amendments
broadened the definition of "repurchase agreements" and "securities
contracts" to include agreements for the purchase and sale of mortgage loans
and interests in mortgage loans. Specifically, the 2005 Amendments
broadened the definition of a "repurchase agreement, 6 8 previously limited to

67.
68.

See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 109-31 pt. 1, at 20(2005).
See II U.S.C.A. § 101(47) (West Supp. 2006), as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 907(a)(1)(C),
119 Stat. 23, 171-72 (2005):
The term "repurchase agreement" (which definition also applies to a reverse
repurchase agreement)(A) means(i) an agreement, including related terms, which provides for
the transfer of one or more certificates of deposit, mortgage
related securities (as defined in section 3 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934), mortgage loans, interests in
mortgage related securities or mortgage loans, eligible
bankers' acceptances, qualified foreign government securities
(defined as a security that is a direct obligation of, or that are
fully guaranteed by, the central government of a member of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development), or securities that are direct obligations of, or
that are fully guaranteed by, the United States or any agency
of the United States against the transfer of funds by the
transferee of such certificates of deposit, eligible bankers'
acceptances, securities, mortgage loans, or interests, with a
simultaneous agreement by such transferee to transfer to the
transferor thereof certificates of deposit, eligible bankers'
acceptance, securities, mortgage loans, or interests of the
kind described in this clause, at a date certain not later than
1 year after such transfer or on demand, against the transfer
of funds;
(ii) any combination of agreements or transactions referred to
in clauses (i) and (iii);
(iii) an option to enter into an agreement or transaction
referred to in clause (i) or (ii);
(iv) a master agreement that provides for an agreement or
transaction referred to in clause (i), (ii), or (iii), together with
all supplements to any such master agreement, without regard
to whether such master agreement provides for an agreement
or transaction that is not a repurchase agreement under this
paragraph, except that such master agreement shall be
considered to be a repurchase agreement under this paragraph
only with respect to each agreement or transaction under the
master agreement that is referred to in clause (i), (ii), or (iii);
or

(v) any security agreement or arrangement or other credit
enhancement related to any agreement or transaction referred
to in clause (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv), including any guarantee or
reimbursement obligation by or to a repo participant or
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obligations of the United States and other highly rated securities, to include
mortgage loans and interests in mortgage loans:
"[R]epurchase agreement" means (A) an agreement, including related terms,
which provides for the transfer of one or more . . . mortgage loans [or]
interests in . . . mortgage loans . . . against the transfer of funds by the
transferee of such ... mortgage loans, or interests, with a simultaneous

agreement by such transferee to transfer to the transferor thereof... mortgage
loans, or interests.., at a date certain not later than 1 year after such transfer
or on demand, against the transfer of funds.69
This definition requires that the seller of the mortgage loans must repurchase
the loans within one year.
Any party to a "repurchase agreement" may terminate, liquidate or
accelerate any repurchase agreement whenever the other party becomes a
debtor in bankruptcy.70 Notwithstanding the automatic stay, the non-debtor
counterparty may exercise any contractual right under any security agreement
or may set off or net out any transfer obligation arising in connection with a
repurchase agreement." The bankruptcy trustee may not avoid any pre-

financial participant in connection with any agreement or
transaction referred to in any such clause, but not to exceed
the damages in connection with any such agreement or
transaction, measured in accordance with section 562 of this
title; and
(B) does not include a repurchase obligation under a participation in a commercial mortgage
loan.
69.
70.

71.

Id.
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 559 (West Supp. 2006), as amendedby Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 907(i), 119 Stat. 23,
179 (2005):
The exercise of a contractual right of a repo participant or financial participant to
cause the liquidation, termination, or acceleration ofa repurchase agreement because
of a condition of the kind specified in section 365(e)(1) of this title [quoted supra
note 63] shall not be stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited by operation of any
provision of this title or by order of a court or administrative agency in any
proceeding under this title, unless, where the debtor is a stockbroker or securities
clearing agency, such order is authorized under the provisions of the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970 or any statute administered by the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b)(7) (West Supp. 2006), as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8,
§ 907(d)(I)(B),(o)(2), 119 Stat. 23, 176, 182 (2005), and as further amended by Pub. L. No.
109-390, § 5(a)(2)(A), 120 Stat 2692, 2696 (2006):
The filing of a petition ... does not operate as a stay under subsection (a) of this
section ... (7) of the exercise by a repo participant or financial participant of any
contractual right (as defined in section 559) under any security agreement or
arrangement or other credit enhancement forming a part of or related to any
repurchase agreement, or of any contractual right (as defined in section 559) to
offset or net out any termination value, payment amount, or other transfer obligation
arising under or in connection with I ormore such agreements, including any master
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petition transfer of property to the counterparty in connection with 73
a
repurchase agreement 72 on the grounds that such transfer was an unperfected,
preferential74 or constructively fraudulent 7 transfer. The definition of a
"securities contract,"76 originally broader than "repurchase agreement," has

72.

73.
74.
75.
76.

agreement for such agreements.
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 546(0 (West Supp. 2006), as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 907(o)(2), 119
Stat. 23, 182 (2005), and asfurtheramended by Pub. L. No. 109-390, § 5(b)(2), 120 Stat 2692, 2698
(2006):
Notwithstanding sections 544, 545, 547, 548(a)(1)(B), and 548(b) of this title, the
trustee may not avoid a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a repo
participant or financial participant, in connection with a repurchase agreement and
that is made before the commencement of the case, except under section
548(a)(1)(A) of this title.
See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (2000) discussedsupra note 64.
See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2000), discussedsupra note 65.
See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2000), discussed supra note 66.
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 741(7) (West Supp. 2006), as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 907(a)(2), 119
Stat. 23, 173-74 (2005), and as further amended by Pub. L. No. 109-390, § 5(a)(3), 120 Stat 2692,
2697 (2006):
"securities contract"--

(A) means-(i) a contract for the purchase, sale, or loan of a security, a certificate of
deposit, a mortgage loan, any interest in a mortgage loan, a group or index of
securities, certificates of deposit, or mortgage loans or interests therein
(including an interest therein or based on the value thereof), or option on any
of the foregoing, including an option to purchase or sell any such security,
certificate of deposit, mortgage loan, interest, group or index, or option, and
including any repurchase or reverse repurchase transaction on any such
security, certificate of deposit, mortgage loan, interest, group or index, or
option (whether or not such repurchase or reverse repurchase transaction is a
"repurchase agreement," as defined in section 101);
(ii) any option entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign
currencies;
(iii) the guarantee (including by novation) by or to any securities clearing
agency of a settlement of cash, securities, certificates of deposit, mortgage
loans or interests therein, group or index of securities, or mortgage loans or
interests therein (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof),
or option on any of the foregoing, including an option to purchase or sell any
such security, certificate of deposit, mortgage loan, interest, group or index,
or option (whether or not such settlement is in connection with any agreement
or transaction referred to in clauses (i) through (xi);
(iv) any margin loan;
(v) any extension of credit for the clearance or settlement of securities
transactions;
(vi) any loan transaction coupled with a securities collar transaction, any
prepaid forward securities transaction, or any total return swap transaction
coupled with a securities sale transaction;
(vii) any other agreement or transaction that is similar to an agreement or
transaction referred to in this subparagraph;
(viii) any combination of the agreements or transactions referred to in this
subparagraph;
(ix) any option to enter into any agreement or transaction referred to in this
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also been expanded to include mortgage loans and interests in mortgage loans.
It specifically means:
a contract for the purchase, sale, or loan of a security, . . a mortgage loan,
any interest in a mortgage loan, a group or index of... or mortgage loans or
interests therein .... or option on any of the foregoing .... and including any

repurchase or reverse repurchase transaction on any [of the foregoing]
(whether or not such repurchase or reverse repurchase transaction is a
"repurchase agreement", as defined in section 101).77
Although the definition of "securities contract" is broader, the parties
protected by the protected transaction provisions for securities contracts are
somewhat narrower.
In the case of a "securities contract," any financial institution or any
"financial participant" may terminate, liquidate or accelerate the securities
contract notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the other party.78 Without regard
to the automatic stay, a financial institution or financial participant may
exercise any contractual right under any security agreement related to any
securities contract and any contractual right to offset or net out any

77.
78.

subparagraph;
(x) a master agreement that provides for an agreement or transaction referred
to in clause (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), or (ix), together with all
supplements to any such master agreement, without regard to whether the
master agreement provides for an agreement or transaction that is not a
securities contract under this subparagraph, except that such master agreement
shall be considered to be a securities contract under this subparagraph only
with respect to each agreement or transaction under such master agreement
that is referred to in clause (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), or (ix); or
(xi) any security agreement or arrangement or other credit enhancement related
to any agreement or transaction referred to in this subparagraph, including any
guarantee or reimbursement obligation by or to a stockbroker, securities
clearing agency, financial institution, or financial participant in connection
with any agreement or transaction referred to in this subparagraph, but not to
exceed the damages in connection with any such agreement or transaction,
measured in accordance with section 562; and
(B) does not include any purchase, sale, or repurchase obligation under a participation in a
commercial mortgage loan.
§ 741(7).
See I1 U.S.C.A. § 555 (West Supp. 2006), as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 907(g),(o)(7), 119
Stat. 23, 177-78, 182 (2005):
The exercise of a contractual right of a stockbroker, financial institution, financial
participant, or securities clearing agency to cause the liquidation, termination, or
acceleration of a securities contract, as defined in section 741 of this title, because of a
condition of the kind specified in section 365(e)(1) of this title shall not be stayed,
avoided, or otherwise limited by operation of any provision of this title or by order of a
court or administrative agency in any proceeding under this title unless such order is
authorized under the provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 or any
statute administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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termination value, payment amount, or other transfer obligation arising under
or in connection with the securities contract.7 9 Finally, the bankruptcy trustee
cannot avoid any pre-petition transfer of property to the financial institution
or financial participant in connection with a securities contract 80 on the
grounds that such transfer was unperfected,8 1 or was a preferential82 or a
constructively fraudulent transfer.83
The limitation to "financial institution" is not a large impediment to using
the protected transaction provisions. A financial institution means a bank but
also includes a customer of the bank when the bank is acting as an agent or
custodian for a customer.84 A "financial participant" is any entity that has
engaged in significant transactions involving repurchase agreements,
securities contracts, and other derivatives.8 5

79.

80.

81.
82.
83.
84.

85.

See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b)(6) (West Supp. 2006), as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8,
§ 907(d)(1)(B),(o)(1) 119 Stat. 23,176, 181 (2005), and asfurtheramendedby Pub. L. No. 109-390,
§ 5(a)(2)(A), 120 Stat 2692, 2696 (2006):
The filing of a petition . . . does not operate as a stay under subsection (a) of this
section . . . (6) under subsection (a) of this section, of the exercise by a commodity
broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, financial
participant, or securities clearing agency of any contractual right (as defined in section
555 or 556) under any security agreement or arrangement or other credit enhancement
forming a part of or related to any commodity contract, forward contract or securities
contract, or of any contractual right (as defined in section 555 or 556) to offset or net out
any termination value, payment amount, or other transfer obligation arising under or in
connection with 1 or more such contracts, including any master agreement for such
contracts.
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 546(f) (West Supp. 2006), as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 907(o)(2), 119
Stat. 23, 182 (2005), and as furtheramendedby Pub. L. No. 109-390, § 5(b)(2), 120 Stat 2692, 2698
(2006):
Notwithstanding sections 544, 545, 547, 548(a)(1)(B), and 548(b) of this title, the trustee
may not avoid a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a repo participant or financial
participant, in connection with a repurchase agreement and that is made before the
commencement of the case, except under section 548(a)(1)(A) of this title.
See 1 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (2000), discussedsupra note 64.
See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2000), discussedsupra note 65.
See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2000), discussedsupra note 66.
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(22) as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 907(b)(1), 119 Stat. 23, 175 (2005)
and as further amended by Pub. L. No. 109-390, § 5(a)(1)(A), 120 Stat. 2692, 2695 (2006):
The term "financial institution" means(A) a Federal reserve bank, or an entity that is a commercial or savings bank, industrial
savings bank, savings and loan association, trust company, federally-insured credit
union, or receiver, liquidating agent, or conservator for such entity and, when any such
Federal reserve bank, receiver, liquidating agent, conservator or entity is acting as agent
or custodian for a customer (whether or not a "customer", as defined in section 741) in
connection with a securities contract (as defined in section 741) such customer.
See § 101(22A), as added by Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 907(b)(2), 119 Stat. 23, 175 (2005), and as
further amended by Pub. L. No. 109-390, § 5(a)(1)(A), 120 Stat. 2692, 2695 (2006):
The term "financial participant" means(A) an entity that, at the time it enters into a securities contract, commodity contract,
swap agreement, repurchase agreement, or forward contract, or at the time of the date of
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These protected transaction provisions will replace and have replaced
some securitization structures and may in the future replace more. Originators
can now obtain financing by entering into "repurchase agreements" or
"securities contracts" with financial institutions, including financial
institutions acting on behalf of investors, and financial participants. These
financial institutions or financial participants will be able to liquidate any
mortgage loans sold to them without regard to the later bankruptcy of the
originator and therefore be able to avoid some of the bankruptcy tax on
secured credit. As of today, however, these protected transaction provisions
may not eliminate all securitization of mortgage loans.
A necessary precondition to a securitization is a true sale of mortgage
loans by an originator to a separate legal entity that removes the loans from
the future bankruptcy estate of the originator. Such a true sale eliminates both
the risk of acceleration of asset backed securities as well as the risk of the
automatic stay. Under the protected transaction provisions, there would no
longer be any need for a "true sale" of the mortgage loans to a separate legal
entity to eliminate the risk of the automatic stay. Nevertheless, without a true
sale, there remains the risk of acceleration.
Therefore, for the many term securitizations of mortgage loans, that is, the
sale of mortgage loans to a certificate trustee and the issuance of certificates
evidencing a beneficial ownership interest in the mortgage loans, investors
may still insist on a true sale to ensure that a bankruptcy trustee for the
originator could not attempt to recharacterize the transfer of the mortgage
loans as a pledge to secure a borrowing. Without a true sale, a bankruptcy
trustee might have an incentive for such an attempt if the value of the
mortgage loans has increased.
For example, assume that an originator sponsored a securitization of
$100,000,000 of 30 year mortgage loans bearing an annual fixed interest rate
of 8% by selling the loans to a trustee and issuing $100,000,000 of mortgage
pass-through certificates. If market mortgage rates were to decline to 6%, the
present value of the mortgage loans would increase dramatically to more than
$122 million without any assumption for prepayment, and to more than $108

the filing of the petition, has one or more agreements or transactions described in
paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), or (6) of section 561 (a) with the debtor or any other entity
(other than an affiliate) of a total gross dollar value of not less than $1,000,000,000 in
notional or actual principal amount outstanding at such time or on any day during the 15month period preceding the date of the filing of the petition, or has gross mark-to-market
positions of not less than S100,000,000 (aggregated across counterparties) in one or more
such agreements or transactions with the debtor or any other entity (other than an
affiliate) at such time or on any day during the 15-month period preceding the date of the
filing of the petition.

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 31

million assuming a constant annual prepayment rate of 10%, which would
cause the entire pool to be paid in a little over 10 years.86 If the originator
became a debtor in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee could seek to accelerate
the certificates, after having them recharacterized as debt obligations, prepay
the certificates at par, that is, $100 million, and pocket the difference, which
could be several millions of dollars. The certificate trustee could liquidate the
mortgage loans upon such an attempt, but this protection from the automatic
stay would not protect the investors' expectations. Although there certainly
can be a true sale without a true sale opinion, without the assurance of a true
sale opinion, investors may not want to bear the risk of such premature
prepayment at par of their above market value certificates upon the liquidation
of the mortgage loans.8 7
On the other hand, for securitization transactions that do not involve long
term securitizations or that otherwise solve the risk of acceleration, originators
can obtain financing without the costs of structuring a securitization. The
most obvious example is warehouse financing or revolving lending
securitizations. In the past, an originator would sell mortgage loans to an SPE,
and the SPE would enter into a warehousing or revolving lending arrangement
with a financial institution. As the originator originated mortgage loans, it
would immediately sell them to the SPE, and the SPE would borrow from the
warehouse lender. The SPE would use the proceeds of the borrowing plus
other cash on hand, including draws on subordinated debt financing, to pay the
purchase price of the mortgage loans. When the SPE had accumulated a
sufficient volume of mortgage loans, the SPE would then sell the mortgage
loans into a term securitization and use the proceeds from the sale to repay the
warehouse lender.

86.
87.

Calculations on file with the author.
A sponsor of a securitization attempted just such opportunistic expropriation of investors' value. In
re WE Financial Co. No. 92-0186 1-TUC-LO (Bankr. D. Ariz. filed June 11, 1992) (on file with the
author). The owners of a solvent SPE caused the SPE to file for bankruptcy for the sole purpose of
accelerating the payment of the SPE's $125 million, high interest debt that by agreement was not
prepayable without a prepayment premium. The collateral securing the debt consisted of
Government National Mortgage Association mortgage pass-through certificates that had appreciated
in value to an amount greater than their face amount because of a decline in interest rates. Upon
acceleration, the SPE as debtor in possession could sell the underlying collateral, use the proceeds
to pay off the debt, and retain a profit of about $11,000,000 to be distributed to its owners. The
trustee for the debt holders strenuously objected on the grounds that, among other things, the petition
was filed in bad faith. Because of the trustee's forceful opposition, the SPE and its owners settled
this case with a reinstatement of all but a small portion of the debt. See Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (for Order Confirming the Amended Plan as Modified) at 2-4, In re WE
Financial Co., supra(filed Feb. 23, 1993) (on file with the author); Amended Disclosure Statement
of WE Financial Co., GWS, and WE 7, Inc. Dated Jan. 11, 1993, as Modified, at 10-21, In re We
Financial Co., supra; Settlement Agreement Dated as of September 1, 1992, at 1-3 (on file with the
author); see also Plank, Security ofSecuritization, supra note 7, at 1728-79 & n.350.
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These structures are cumbersome, and they create some tensions for both
the originator and the warehouse lender. To ensure sufficient isolation of the
mortgage loans from the bankruptcy risk of the originator, the structure must
resist the desires of the originator to exercise direct control over the mortgage
loans and the desires of the warehouse lenders for additional protection in the
form of guarantees from the originator. Increasingly, instead of these
warehouse lending SPEs, originators and lenders are using "repurchase
agreements" and "securities contracts," as defined in the Bankruptcy Code,
both of which are documented in the industry through "repurchase
agreements""8 even if they do not meet the restricted Bankruptcy Code
definition of "repurchase agreement." In these cases, the lenders are not
concerned about the risk of acceleration. They obtain the full benefit of
immediate relief from the automatic stay to liquidate the mortgage loans if the
originator becomes a debtor in bankruptcy. Originators do not need to incur
the costs of establishing a separate SPE, true sale and non-consolidation
opinions, and the restrictions on the structure required for such opinions.
Other mortgage loan transactions may also benefit from the 2005
Amendments. To the extent that the mortgage loans are adjustable rate
mortgage loans, or the parties can otherwise cover the risk of the acceleration
of premium mortgage loans, protected transactions for mortgage loans may
replace securitizations. The market, which is the best forum for allocating
resources, will find the optimum level, even at the cost of early
experimentation and losses.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Code contains provisions that transfer value from secured
creditors to the bankruptcy professionals that control, and that benefit from,
bankruptcy cases and, theoretically, to the unsecured creditors of debtors in
bankruptcy. I have argued elsewhere that the Bankruptcy Code should be
amended to require bankruptcy professionals and the unsecured creditors to
bear the full costs of a chapter 11 reorganization by respecting the value of a

88.

See Bond Market Association, Master Repurchase Agreement § 19(a) at 11 (Sept. 1996 version)
(copy on file with the author):
The parties recognize that each Transaction is a "repurchase agreement" as that term is
defined in Section 10 1 of Title 11 of the United States Code, as amended (except insofar
as the type of Securities subject to such Transaction or the term of such Transaction
would render such definition inapplicable), and a "securities contract" as that term is
defined in Section 741 of Title 11 of the United States Code, as amended (except insofar
as the type of assets subject to such Transaction would render such definition
inapplicable).
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secured creditor's property interest, including the payment of interest to
undersecured creditors to the extent of the value of their collateral.8 9 But short
of that more radical change, the Bankruptcy Code should be amended to
eliminate the bankruptcy tax on secured creditors that lend to originators of
all receivables.9" The very existence of a several trillion dollar securitization
industry dramatically illustrates the irrationality of the Bankruptcy Code's
treatment of receivables. The 2005 Amendments take one step closer to
rationality by exempting mortgage loans from the bankruptcy tax on secured
creditors. The only regret is that these 2005 Amendments were limited to
mortgage loans. 9

See Plank, Security of Securitization, supra note 7, at 1736-38.
See id. at 1738-41.
The bills that eventually became the 2005 Amendments contained a provision, the famous "Section
912," that would have excluded from the bankruptcy estate financial assets sold in a securitization
in which the securities received an investment grade rating. In another display of the irrationality
of Congress' regulation of financial markets, at the prodding of parties adverse to securitization,
Congress eliminated this section after the collapse of Enron corporation. Plank, Security of
Securitization,supra note 7, at 1730-33. I also opposed the inclusion of § 912, but for different
reasons. This section would have eliminated much of the structural costs of a securitization, but only
for those securities that achieved an investment grade rating. A better solution would be an
elimination of the structural costs of securitization for all receivables, and the bankruptcy tax on all
secured creditors that finance the originators of receivables.

